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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEACHING REMEDIES AS A CAPSTONE COURSE

RUSSELL L. WEAVER* AND DAVID F. PARTLETT**
The debate about the divide between the legal academy and the legal
profession is perennial and, in times of economic stress, of increasing
urgency.1 Historically, law school critics have portrayed law professors as
living their lives, and teaching their classes, from “ivory towers” that are
divorced from the day-to-day realities of law practice. While law professors
might teach students how to read cases and analyze precedent, so the critique
went, they did little to teach students how to function like practicing lawyers.2
The Carnegie Report has thrown down the gauntlet to law schools to
reform curricula in order to better educate lawyers for today’s challenges.3
Law schools have done some things right, such as rigorously training students
* Professor of Law & Distinguished University Scholar, University of Louisville, Louis D.
Brandeis School of Law.
** Asa Griggs Candler Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law.
1. Herma Hill Kay, former President of the Association of American Law Schools,
summarized the situation as follows: “Judge Harry Edwards warned us at the Annual Meeting in
1988 that, given the existence of ‘major structural problems that threaten to alter the basic fabric
of legal systems . . . we can no longer afford law schools isolated in a world of their own.’”
Herma Hill Kay, President’s Message: Lawyers and Law Teachers: Are We in the Same
Profession?, ASS’N AM. L. SCH. NEWSL., Dec. 1989, at 1.
2. Cf. David R. Brink, Sartor Resartus—The Professor Takes the Exam, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC.
362, 363 (1982) (“[T]o those who say the purpose [of legal education] is also to prepare legal
scholars, judges, house counsel, public servants, and civic and business leaders, I say that the
training of those students is also incomplete unless they have learned what a practicing lawyer
must know.”); see also Robert L. Doyel, The Clinical Lawyer School: Has Jerome Frank
Prevailed?, 18 NEW ENG. L. REV. 577, 578–79 (1983) (arguing that law schools should educate
law students to act like lawyers). One practitioner related the following anecdote:
[L]aw school had me very well-schooled to do research with a large firm and had me
moderately well-schooled to argue cases on appeal, but did not have me schooled at all to
talk to clients, to answer questions, or even to know the questions to ask. How
embarrassing it was when I first went down to the District Clerk’s office to ask, “How do
I do so-and-so?” and was told, “Well, you need to ask a lawyer about that!”
James E. Brill, Teaching and Testing Clinical Skills, in LEGAL EDUCATION AND LAWYER
COMPETENCY: CURRICULA FOR CHANGE 37, 38 (Fernand N. Dutile ed., 1981); see also WILLIAM
M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW
(2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT] (examining legal education and recommending
improvements).
3. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 2.
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to think like lawyers. But they have failed to employ the latest pedagogical
methods to equip graduates with either the ability to cope with the world in
which they will practice law, or the set of skills that will enhance their role as
professionals.4 The Carnegie Report came at a time when the model of legal
education was resistant to changes, but it eventually came under an acid test
born of a severe decline in the demand for graduates. Thus, the marketplace
has added a great impetus to the need for reform. Those law schools most
vulnerable to the rigors of the market have responded with greater alacrity.5
Those at the top of the pyramid have also felt the need to look again at their
curricula and to offer a richer menu of courses.6 And, indeed, law schools have
developed and implemented a variety of so-called “skill courses,” such as
legal writing, trial practice, negotiations, legal drafting, appellate practice, and
client counseling, designed to give students simulated practical experience.
Moreover, most law schools now offer students the opportunity to work in
live-client clinics, and some schools offer several different types of clinics
ranging from representation of indigent clients to entrepreneurial law. Some
law schools, most notably Washington and Lee, in an attempt to carry skills
training even farther, have developed a special third-year “experiential
learning” program.7 Students spend the entirety of their third year engaged in

4. See id. at 24.
5. As a result of the MacCrate Report, AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. &
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (1992), which urged a greater concentration on skills training in law
schools, some law schools accented their curricula to that purpose, e.g., the University of
Richmond School of Law. See Skills Training and Pro Bono Opportunities, U. RICH. SCH. L.,
law.richmond.edu/academics/skills/index.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
6. For instance, Vanderbilt University Law School has recently added a dual-degree
program in law and economics in 2006. See Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Law and Economics
as a Pillar of Legal Education i (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch.: Law & Econ., Working Paper No.
11-35, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1907760. The authors note that almost one
third of the professors in the top thirteen law schools have Ph.D.s. Id. at 4.
7. See Russell L. Weaver & Michael B. Kelly, Teaching and Learning Law in the United
States: New Paradigms and Approaches, in AMERICAN LAW TODAY (Pascal Mbongo & Russell
L. Weaver eds., forthcoming 2013); see also Lyman Johnson, Robert Danforth & David Millon,
Washington and Lee University School of Law: Reforming the Third Year of Law School, in
REFORMING LEGAL EDUCATION: LAW SCHOOLS AT THE CROSSROADS 11 (David M. Moss &
Debra Moss Curtis eds., 2012) (describing the third-year curriculum at Washington and Lee). The
call here is to utilize as fully as possible the third year of the J.D. degree. It may be noted that
some, including Judge Richard Posner, have called for a serious consideration of the shortening
of the law degree to two years. Already Northwestern University Law School offers an
accelerated two-year degree to select students. It may be noted that the degree requires an early
start in the summer before and work during the summer between the first and second years. The
tuition is the same as that charged for the three-year degree. See Accelerated JD, NW. L.,
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/academics/ajd/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2013); see also Debra
Cassens Weiss, Two-Year Law School Was a Good Idea in 1970, and It’s a Good Idea Now, Prof
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“experiential” learning that emphasizes lawyering activities through live-client
clinics, practicum courses designed to simulate actual law practice, and
externships in law offices and judicial chambers.8 The fall semester begins
with a two-week course that provides students with an intensive introduction to
litigation skills, and the spring semester begins with a two-week intensive
transactional skills course.9 The purpose of these courses is to provide students
with the lawyering skills that they will need to participate in clinics,
practicums, and externships.10 Other law schools have not been as
thoroughgoing with their reforms, opting for interstitial changes such as
transactional law streams of course offerings.11
Although, as the foregoing suggests, the ivory tower is not as insular as it
once was, there nevertheless remains a considerable gap, some would say a
chasm, between the academy and the profession. The structure of the normal
law school within the university and patterns of faculty recruitment make
American law schools highly conservative institutions relatively impervious to
the call for skills reform.12 Accordingly, most classes still strongly trend
towards the academic rather than the practical. Still rings the clarion call for
change.13
In this short Article, we suggest how the Remedies course can be used as a
“capstone course” that will help prepare students to deal with the “practical”
side of law as well as achieve a significant intellectual end in tying up the
unraveled sleeves of earlier discrete courses in a coherent whole. We believe
that the Remedies course offers students a unique and valuable opportunity to
integrate the theoretical with the practical and to learn practical skills in the
context of a substantive course. The net effect is that students can take their
overall understanding of the law to a much deeper level, and can do so in ways
that cannot be accomplished in skills courses alone. In other words, the

Tells ABA Task Force, ABA J. (Feb. 9, 2013, 7:36 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
two-year_law_school_was_a_good_idea_in_1970_and_its_a_good_idea_now/ (detailing Duke
University law professor Paul Carrington’s support of a two-year legal education).
8. See Johnson et al., supra note 7, at 39.
9. Id. at 24–25.
10. Id. at 23.
11. Tina Stark has been an advocate for helping students “think like . . . deal lawyer[s],”
developing transactional programs at Emory University and Boston University. For her overview
of such a program, see Tina L. Stark, Conference Introduction: My Fantasy Curriculum & Other
Almost Random Thoughts, 2009 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 3 (emphasis added).
12. See David F. Partlett, The Eras of American Legal Scholarship: The Making of a
Priesthood, in AMERICAN LAW TODAY (Pascal Mbongo & Russell L. Weaver eds., forthcoming
2013) (manuscript at 28–29) (on file with authors).
13. See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012); Harry T. Edwards, The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34
(1992); Wayne S. Hyatt, A Lawyer’s Lament: Law Schools and the Profession of Law, 60 VAND.
L. REV. 385 (2007).
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Remedies course provides one way to help bridge the gap between law school
and practice. It builds a competence that provides knowledge of the
interlocking nature of the law, and its capacity for change. Through a series of
well-developed problems, students can gain confidence in applying skills to the
changing workplace in which they will find themselves during their
professional lives. Before we embark on the description of the capstone
Remedies course, we want to set the scene that makes American law schools
what they are today. We concede at the outset that the law school, as it has
evolved, has served the nation well. But that does not imply that we should be
content with its present form.
I. LANGDELL AND THE DIVIDE BETWEEN THE “ACADEMIC” AND THE
“PRACTICAL” SIDES OF LAW14
The gap between the academy and the profession did not always exist.
During the colonial era, law was not generally taught in a university setting.
Instead, prospective lawyers would apprentice themselves to practicing
lawyers so that they could “learn by doing.”15 During this period, the practice
of law was regarded as a trade, like blacksmithing or carpentry, that could be
best learned by working with those who were accomplished in the profession,
and the focus was on the practical rather than the theoretical.16 Apprenticeship
was so common that “[f]ive signers of the Declaration of Independence and six
members of the Constitutional Convention obtained their legal education in
this manner.”17 A few lawyers were trained through the English Inns of
Court.18 But that training was designed to inculcate professional standards and
the folkways of the profession.19 The university’s place in legal education
came late in the home of the common law. Most English lawyers were
classically educated, and then trained through the Inns of Court, despite chairs

14. Portions of this section rely heavily on Professor Weaver’s prior publication, Russell L.
Weaver, Langdell’s Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36 VILL. L. REV. 517 (1991). This use
has been approved by the Villanova Law Review.
15. See ALBERT J. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 18–19 (1953); JOSEF
REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW
SCHOOLS: A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING 7
(1914); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO
THE 1980S 3 (1983); J. H. Landman, The Problem Method of Studying Law, 5 J. LEGAL EDUC.
500, 501 (1953).
16. See Ralph Michael Stein, The Path of Legal Education from Edward I to Langdell: A
History of Insular Reaction, 57 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 429, 444–45 (1981).
17. Id. at 439–40.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 436.
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in law and jurisprudence at Oxford.20 It was to arrive earlier in America but not
in a straight and obvious path.
Although law schools had existed for some time, the early U.S. law
schools were proprietary in nature,21 and most universities offered legal study
only through chairs in law, if at all.22 University-based law schools did not
begin appearing until the early nineteenth century.23 These early universitybased law schools struggled for their existence. During “the first twelve years
of its existence, the Harvard Law School averaged less than nine students a
year, and the few who enrolled attended irregularly.”24 The school’s fortunes
improved in 1829 with the appointment of Mr. Justice Story as the first Dane
Professor of Law.25 Enrollment immediately jumped to twenty-four students,

20. See Partlett, supra note 12, at 5. As John Baker points out, while students may attend
readings at universities, they learned “their common law by self-help.” JOHN BAKER, LEGAL
EDUCATION IN LONDON 1250–1850, at 11–12 (2007).
21. The first law school is believed to have been the Litchfield Law School, which was
founded in 1784 by Tapping Reeve, later Chief Justice of Connecticut and author of a treatise on
domestic relations. See MARIAN C. MCKENNA, TAPPING REEVE AND THE LITCHFIELD LAW
SCHOOL 59 (1986); REDLICH, supra note 15, at 7. Litchfield students did outside reading and
attended lectures. More than 1000 students attended during the school’s fifty-year existence, and
many went on to illustrious careers. See HARNO, supra note 15, at 28–32 (stating that Litchfield
produced 101 members of Congress, twenty-eight U.S. Senators, three U.S. Supreme Court
Justices, six cabinet members, thirty-four state supreme court justices, fourteen state governors,
and ten lieutenant governors). The second law school was located at Northampton,
Massachusetts, and was also a proprietary school. See Louis D. Brandeis, The Harvard Law
School, 1 GREEN BAG 10, 11 (1889).
22. The first chair, established at William and Mary College by Thomas Jefferson and
initially filled by George Wythe, was dedicated to the study of “Law and Police.” See HARNO,
supra note 15, at 23; Stein, supra note 16, at 441–42. Other universities soon established chairs as
well. See STEVENS, supra note 15, at 4; Brandeis, supra note 21, at 11; Brainerd Currie, The
Materials of Law Study, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 331, 350 (1951) (“In 1790 James Wilson was
appointed professor of law at the College of Philadelphia. In 1793 James Kent was appointed
professor of law at Columbia. Finally, in 1799, Transylvania University appointed George
Nicholas . . . [as] ‘Professor of Law and Politics.’” (footnotes omitted)).
23. Harvard Law School was established in 1817. See Henry Wade Rogers, Section
Chairman, Address at the A.B.A. Section of Legal Education Annual Meeting (Aug. 22, 1894), in
17 REP. A.B.A. 389, 396 (1894) [hereinafter Address by Henry Wade Rogers]. Yale Law School
began in 1824 by taking over a proprietary school, and the University of Virginia School of Law
began the next year. Id. There is debate about whether the College of William and Mary’s
Marshall-Wythe School of Law was created in the eighteenth century. Compare ALFRED
ZANTZINGER REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW: HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPAL CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE
UNITED STATES WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF CONDITIONS IN ENGLAND AND CANADA 44 (1921)
(stating that William and Mary Law School was founded in 1779), with HARNO, supra note 15, at
23 (asserting that William and Mary merely founded a chair of law in 1779).
24. HARNO, supra note 15, at 40.
25. Id. at 41.
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and by 1844 it had reached 163.26 Nevertheless, throughout much of this
period, many questioned whether law was a discipline that could or should be
taught in a university environment. Many regarded the practice of law as a
“craft” that could best be learned through the apprenticeship method.27 This
view was shared by many would-be lawyers, a significant percentage of which
chose to receive their training as apprentices.28
At the early law schools, law teaching was primarily lecture oriented.29
Some law schools used a “text and lecture” method, whereby students were
asked to read “texts” or other learned discussions as a prelude to attending
lectures.30 Until instructors began writing their own texts, students commonly
studied Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries.31 There were some variances
in approach. For example, George Wythe of William and Mary lectured but
also “held practice courts in the Virginia state capital.”32 Columbia innovated
by adopting the “Dwight method,”33 developed by Professor Theodore W.
Dwight, which incorporated student recitations into the lecture method.34 After
Dwight would summarize and critique a section of Blackstone, he would ask
students questions about the material during the next class.35 For a while, the
Dwight method provided the foundation of instruction at most law schools and
was the sole method of instruction at a few schools.36 Under the various
versions of the lecture method, cases were not entirely ignored. Faculty would

26. Id. at 47.
27. See, e.g., THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA 211 (1918) (“[T]he
law school belongs in the modern university no more than a school of fencing or dancing.”); John
Henry Schlegel, Langdell’s Legacy or, the Case of the Empty Envelope, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1517,
1517 (1984) (book review).
28. See HARNO, supra note 15, at 39 (“[L]egal education was nothing more than the
mastering of a craft, the skills for which had to be passed on from the practitioner to the
novice.”); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 264
(1950); Currie, supra note 22, at 344 (“In this country also legal education was regarded generally
as training in an art, to be acquired by apprenticeship—a conception which is unfriendly to the
thesis that higher learning is essential.”).
29. See REDLICH, supra note 15, at 7; Brandeis, supra note 21, at 11–16; Wayne L. Morse,
Changing Trends in Legal Education, 11 OR. L. REV. 39, 41 (1931).
30. See REDLICH, supra note 15, at 7; Courtney Kenny, The Case-Method of Teaching Law,
16 J. SOC’Y COMP. LEGIS. 182, 185 (1916); Address by Henry Wade Rogers, supra note 23, at
404.
31. See Kenny, supra note 30, at 184.
32. Stein, supra note 16, at 442.
33. See REDLICH, supra note 15, at 8; Rosamond Parma, The Origin, History and
Compilation of the Case-Book, 14 L. LIBR. J. 14, 16 (1921).
34. Address by Henry Wade Rogers, supra note 23, at 404–05.
35. Kenny, supra note 30, at 185–86.
36. See Comm. on Legal Educ., Proper Course of Study for American Law Schools, 26 AM.
L. REV. 705, 705 (1892).
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lecture about them, and texts would discuss them, but cases were not the
primary emphasis of the approach.37
Legal education underwent a dramatic transition with the appointment of
Christopher Columbus Langdell as Harvard’s dean in 1870.38 Langdell’s
innovation was the introduction of the case method of teaching which involved
student examination of judicial decisions coupled with Socratic-style
analysis.39 Langdell’s “case method” was quite different from other teaching
methods.40 He did not lecture students about the meaning of judicial
decisions.41 Instead, he asked students to read the decisions, and to decide for
themselves what the decisions meant.42 Professors interacted with students
through the “Socratic method,” guiding students in their evaluation of judicial
decisions.43 Langdell would ask students to “tell what the facts were, how the
litigation developed, what point was at issue, what the court had decided, and
the court’s reasoning.”44 Langdell would then solicit the students’ opinions and
reactions to the cases.45 Finally, Langdell would inquire as to “whether the
case followed others which the class had read, or was inconsistent; whether it
could be ‘distinguished’; and so on.”46

37. See Simeon E. Baldwin, Remarks at the A.B.A. Section of Legal Education Annual
Meeting (Aug. 22, 1894), in 17 REP. A.B.A. 351, 375–76 (1894).
38. See HARNO, supra note 15, at 55, 59; STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 718 (2d ed. 1989);
STEVENS, supra note 15, at 36–37; ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD: A
HISTORY OF IDEAS AND MEN, 1817–1967, at 162 (1967); Charles R. McManis, The History of
First Century American Legal Education: A Revisionist Perspective, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 597, 598
(1981); Stein, supra note 16, at 448–53.
39. See REED, supra note 23, at 369.
40. See Franklin G. Fessenden, The Rebirth of the Harvard Law School, 33 HARV. L. REV.
493, 498–500 (1920).
41. See Samuel F. Batchelder, Christopher C. Langdell, 18 GREEN BAG 437, 440 (1906);
Anthony Chase, The Birth of the Modern Law School, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 329, 332 (1979);
Fessenden, supra note 40, at 498–99.
42. See REDLICH, supra note 15, at 12–13; Brandeis, supra note 21, at 19; Tom C. Clark,
Some Thoughts on Legal Education, 12 AM. U. L. REV. 125, 127 (1963); Sydney G. Fisher, The
Teaching of Law by the Case System, 27 AM. L. REG. 416, 416–17 (1888); Kenny, supra note 30,
at 187; Robert Stevens, Legal Education: The Challenge of the Past, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 475,
479 (1985); Eugene Wambaugh, Professor Langdell—A View of His Career, 20 HARV. L. REV. 1,
2 (1906).
43. See Amasa M. Eaton, Remarks at the A.B.A. Section of Legal Education Annual
Meeting (Aug. 22, 1894), in 17 REP. A.B.A. 351, 378 (1894).
44. SUTHERLAND, supra note 38, at 179; see also REDLICH, supra note 15, at 12 (“Langdell
began his actual teaching by having each of the cases, which the students had to study carefully in
preparation for the class, briefly analyzed by one of them with respect to the facts and the law
contained in it.”).
45. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 38, at 179.
46. Id.
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The case method rapidly gained acceptance and ultimately became the
dominant method of teaching law in the United States.47 As Dean of the
Harvard Law School, Langdell had the opportunity “to shape the whole
program of a leading school to a new technique, and thence both to redirect
and to warp the course of law training in the United States.”48 Langdell seized
that opportunity and radically altered legal education.49 Those who did not use
the case method employed other methods, such as the problem method, that
evolved from it.
However, the case method also came with baggage associated with the
environment in which it was created and introduced. Langdell had very limited
conceptions of law that ultimately drove his implementation of the case
method. In the style of the period, Langdell viewed law as a “science”50 and
believed that it should be studied by scientific methods.51 In his view, scientific
method involved an examination of “original sources”52—the printed reports of

47. See ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCH., 1943 HANDBOOK 166 (1944); HARNO, supra note 15, at
137; Barry B. Boyer & Roger C. Cramton, American Legal Education: An Agenda for Research
and Reform, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 224 (1974); Currie, supra note 22, at 332; Stein, supra
note 16, at 452; Bill Blum & Gina Lobaco, The Case Against the Case System, CAL. LAW., Mar.
1984, at 30, 31.
48. HURST, supra note 28, at 261.
49. See REDLICH, supra note 15, at 9; James Barr Ames, Professor Langdell—His Services
to Legal Education, 20 HARV. L. REV. 12, 13 (1906). But see GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF
AMERICAN LAW 42 (1977) (“[I]f Langdell had not existed, we would have had to invent him . . . .
Langdell’s idea evidently corresponded to the felt necessities of the time.”); McManis, supra note
38, at 598 (“Credit—or blame—for the development of the narrow professional model of
American legal education has traditionally gone to Christopher Columbus Langdell . . . .”).
50. See Christopher Columbus Langdell, Address to Harvard Law School Association (Nov.
5, 1886), in 2 CHARLES WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF EARLY
LEGAL CONDITIONS IN AMERICA 374 (1908) [hereinafter Address by Dean Langdell]; see also
HARNO, supra note 15, at 56; HURST, supra note 28, at 262; WARREN, supra, at 361; Batchelder,
supra note 41, at 438; Brandeis, supra note 21, at 19; Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools,
56 YALE L.J. 1303, 1304 (1947); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1,
5 (1983); Landman, supra note 15, at 502; Stein, supra note 16, at 449.
51. See Batchelder, supra note 41, at 439; Frank, supra note 50, at 1304; Landman, supra
note 15, at 502; Stein, supra note 16, at 449–50; Wambaugh, supra note 42, at 2. Langdell was a
product of his times. Many believed that law was susceptible to scientific analysis. See HARNO,
supra note 15, at 61–62; REDLICH, supra note 15, at 16; Comm. on Legal Educ., supra note 36, at
707; Edward Fry, Some Aspects of Law Teaching, 9 L. Q. REV. 115, 127 (1893); William A.
Keener, The Inductive Method in Legal Education, in 17 REP. A.B.A. 473, 475 (1894); Address
by Henry Wade Rogers, supra note 23, at 394–95; Christopher G. Tiedeman, Methods of Legal
Education III, 1 YALE L.J. 150, 153 (1892).
52. See Batchelder, supra note 41, at 439; Stein, supra note 16, at 449; Wambaugh, supra
note 42, at 2.
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cases53—from which students should seek to uncover the fundamental rules
and principles of law:
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To
have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility
and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a
true lawyer; and hence to acquire that mastery should be the business of every
earnest student of law. Each of these doctrines has arrived at its present state
by slow degrees; in other words, it is a growth, extending in many cases
through centuries. This growth is to be traced in the main through a series of
54
cases . . . .

It is doubtful Langdell really believed that law was a “science” in the same
sense as the physical sciences (e.g., two parts of hydrogen and one part of
oxygen always produces water); it was much more a description of a body of
knowledge that could be reduced to principles. Recall that the Whiggish spirit
of the times was imbued by the sense that society was evolving through
ineluctable forces to its betterment.55 Moreover, Langdell had a strategic
reason for viewing law as “science”: early law schools struggled for their
survival against skeptics who viewed law as a craft, believed that law could
best be learned by apprenticeship, and questioned whether it was appropriate to
teach this craft in a university setting.56 These attitudes were not new.
Blackstone had previously encountered them in his unsuccessful effort to
establish a college of law at Oxford.57 Langdell’s view of law as a “science”
altered the terms of the debate. If law really was a science, then it deserved
serious academic study. James Bradley Thayer, one of Langdell’s colleagues
and contemporaries, outlined the nature of the debate when he remarked, “If
our law be not a science worthy and requiring to be thus studied and thus
taught, then, as a distinguished lawyer has remarked, ‘A University will best
consult its own dignity in declining to teach it.”’58 Langdell, the “distinguished
lawyer” being quoted, stated further, “If [the law] be not a science, it is a

53. See HARNO, supra note 15, at 56, 58; HURST, supra note 28, at 262; Batchelder, supra
note 41, at 439; Brandeis, supra note 21, at 19–20; Fessenden, supra note 40, at 498; Stein, supra
note 16, at 449–50.
54. C. C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vi (1871).
55. See, e.g., THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE
ACCESSION OF JAMES II (Philadelphia, Porter & Coates n.d.) (providing a representative and
respected example of “Whig history”).
56. See HARNO, supra note 15, at 39; Currie, supra note 22, at 356, 360–61 (detailing
difficulties at Harvard during the first twelve years and at the University of Virginia).
57. See James Bradley Thayer, The Teaching of English Law at Universities, 9 HARV. L.
REV. 169, 171–72 (1895).
58. Id. at 173; see also Keener, supra note 51, at 475 (“If law is a science—and if it is not a
science it has no place in the curriculum of a university—all will agree that the most scientific
method should be adopted in teaching law.”).
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species of handicraft, and may best be learned by serving an apprenticeship to
one who practices it.”59 Langdell vociferously argued that law was a “science”
worthy of being taught at a university.60
Langdell’s scientific view of law led to a distancing of university-based
law teaching from the practicing bar. Whereas prior law teachers had been
distinguished practitioners or jurists, who imparted their wisdom and
experience to their students, Langdell began hiring law teachers with little or
no practical experience.61 If law was a “science” and not a “craft,” and was to
be learned by academic study, there was no need to have active practitioners
teach it.62 As a result, law schools began to consciously distance themselves
from the practicing bar.
Of course, the premises for Langdell’s theory ultimately did not survive.
Through the sustained attacks of the Realists,63 American academics
eventually came to totally reject Langdell’s idea that law is a “science” in the
same sense as the natural sciences.64 As one commentator noted, the “case
method threw tremendous emphasis on particular cases and particular facts,
and created the erroneous impression that a science of law would eventually
emerge from this mass of material.”65 Professor Grant Gilmore, one of
Langdell’s harshest and acerbic critics, dismissed Langdell as “an essentially
stupid man who, early in his life, hit on one great idea to which, thereafter, he
clung with all the tenacity of genius.”66 Gilmore was especially critical of
Langdell’s belief that law is a science: “The jurisprudential premise of
Langdell and his followers was that there is such a thing as the one true rule of
law which, being discovered, will endure, without change, forever. This
strange idea colored, explicitly or implicitly, all the vast literature which the
Langdellians produced.”67

59. Address by Dean Langdell, supra note 50, at 374.
60. See id.
61. See Batchelder, supra note 41, at 441; Joseph H. Beale, James Barr Ames—His Life and
Character, 23 HARV. L. REV. 325, 326 (1910); Chase, supra note 41, at 338; Charles W. Eliot,
James Barr Ames, 23 HARV. L. REV. 321, 321–22 (1910).
62. See HURST, supra note 28, at 263–64; Batchelder, supra note 41, at 439; Charles W.
Eliot, Langdell and the Law School, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 518, 520–21 (1920); Fessenden, supra note
40, at 512; Thayer, supra note 57, at 174–75.
63. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 62–120
(1960).
64. See Boyer & Cramton, supra note 47, at 225.
65. Robert Maynard Hutchins, Legal Education, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 357 (1937).
66. GILMORE, supra note 49, at 42.
67. Id. at 43; see also Frank, supra note 50, at 1313 (criticizing Langdell’s “neurotic
wizardry”); Landman, supra note 15, at 504 (“It is a matter for derision to expect an immature
and inexperienced student to elicit the rule of law from one case and call that scientific
induction.”); Stephen Wizner, What is a Law School?, 38 EMORY L.J. 701, 709 (1989)
(describing Professor Jerome Frank’s critiques of the case method).
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Despite the debunking of Langdell’s premises at the hands of realists like
Gilmore, the case method itself survived and even prospered. The case method
would become the primary method of instruction in U.S. law schools and every
U.S. law school eventually adopted it.68 Although new forms of teaching, such
as the problem method, evolved from the case method, they were consistent
with Langdell’s basic assumptions about how law should be taught: students
should examine primary source materials, whether statutes or cases, and should
reach their own conclusions about how problems should be resolved.69 The
professor’s function is to stimulate student thought in a Socratic fashion.
Although Langdell may have been ridiculed, his law school thrived and his
view of legal education became a model for professional education within the
university.70 More telling than the idea of the study of law as a science was
Langdell’s success in securing the position of the law school in the pantheon of
schools that make up the fabric of the modern American university. Thus the
American law school assumed a place well before the establishment of
university-based law schools elsewhere in the common law world.71 In order to
secure firmly the mooring to the university, Langdell lured to his faculty
former students who had little grounding in the profession but were
academically brilliant and hewed to his ideas of law teaching. Moreover, the
way in which the law was taught was financially attractive to the university.
Large classes and small faculties were a bonanza. The model stood in stark
contrast to medical schools that placed much more emphasis on practical
training after the Flexner Report.72 Thus the twig was bent73 in the law
68. See Address by Henry Wade Rogers, supra note 23, at 404–05.
69. The problem today is that many new law professors, disconnected from practice and
profession, produce interdisciplinary work that treats either legal doctrine or social science in a
superficial way. It is not clear that this interdisciplinary perspective can help in teaching the
doctrinal and functional complexity of the problems facing modern lawyers. See Partlett, supra
note 12, at 23.
70. See Lee C. Bollinger, Statement on the Future of Journalism Education, COLUM. U.
REC., Apr. 25, 2003, at 8. President Bollinger of Columbia University holds up law school as a
model for the academic and professional development of journalism programs. For comment, see
Felicity Barringer, At Columbia, Journalists and the Faculty Rewrite a Journalism Curriculum,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2003, at B3.
71. David Ibbetson speculates that the European ius commune and the continental, university
model of legal education did not make headway in England because England already had a
professional system of legal education and practice at the time that the Roman Law swept through
Europe. Even in the common law’s throes, caused by Francis Bacon’s criticisms and suggestion
of codification, most English lawyers viewed the hypertrophy of the civil law and grimaced. See
David Ibbetson, Regius Professor of Civil Law, Cambridge, Selden Society Lecture (July 20,
2000), in COMMON LAW AND IUS COMMUNE 20–21, 26–27 (2001).
72. See ABRAHAM FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA:
A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING (1910).
73. “[A]s the twig is bent the tree’s inclin’d.” ALEXANDER POPE, Epistle I: Of the
Knowledge and Characters of Men, in THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS OF ALEXANDER POPE
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curriculum and in the nature of the faculty whose responsibility it was to equip
and prepare generations of law students for the practice of law. As a
consequence, the profession had the task of taking the academically qualified
graduate and training him in the practice of the law.74 This was not an
unwelcome task in the day when the margins in law firms’ profits could
comfortably subsidize the training. To shift the cost of this training to the law
schools, however, while much talked about, faced, and continues to face,
severe obstacles. The faculty of law schools were directed even more to the
academic mission and the practical was anathema. This was encouraged by a
puissant force to bring scholarship into the fold of the university with its
emphasis on its standing in the social sciences.75 Dean Roscoe Pound had
fought for the law faculty to have its place in the university and outside the
profession.76 It is a battle that he resoundingly won. While shaping legal
education down to the present day, it ill fits today with the flagging finances of
law schools.77 From cash cows, they have become claimants within the
university. This meant that bridging the gap between law school and practice
by, for example, expanding to provide new clinical programs for skills
training, became economically infeasible.78
The history of the American law school and its success stands in the way
of a radical change in the way lawyers are trained. Even though some law
schools may initiate reform, usually for reasons to do with their posture in the
competitive market for students, it is unlikely that those in the elite category
will be minded to make changes except at the margin. To be sure, as noted,
numerous attempts have been made to fill the divide between the academy and
the bar, with many law schools establishing “skills courses” or live-client
clinics. However, such changes are more tolerated than embraced by
mainstream faculty who guard their tenured prerogatives against invasion by

157, 159 (Henry W. Boynton ed., 1903). This is a simple version of path dependence upon which
so many of our social institutions have evolved. See, e.g., Cristiano Antonelli, The Economics of
Path-Dependence in Industrial Organization, 15 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 643 (1997).
74. See MARJORIE M. SHULTZ & SHELDON ZEDECK, FINAL REPORT: IDENTIFICATION,
DEVELOPMENT, AND VALIDATION OF PREDICTORS FOR SUCCESSFUL LAWYERING 13 (2008)
(suggesting that test scores and GPA taken alone were not sufficient indicators of lawyering
success), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/LSACREPORTfinal-12.pdf.
75. For an early example of this in the work of Roscoe Pound, see N. E. H. HULL, ROSCOE
POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 67 (1997).
76. See id. at 92–93.
77. See David Barnhizer, Redesigning the American Law School, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV.
249, 252–53; Phillip J. Closius, The Incredible Shrinking Law School, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 581,
584 (2000). In discussing the University of Toledo College of Law’s finances, the former dean of
the school, Phillip Closius, said “income flow generated by the law [school had] diminished,
given the rising costs of technology, student scholarships, and expensive pedagogical programs
(e.g. skills training and legal writing)[,]” as well as downsizing in admissions. Id.
78. See Partlett, supra note 12, at 29.
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clinician and skills-training teachers. The lack of prestige accorded to nondoctrinal faculty is reflected in the fact that these “other” teachers may be on
contract, rather than on tenure track, and may be granted fewer voting
privileges than doctrinal faculty. The governance of law faculties guarantees
the sustenance of this bias.
We do not attribute to Langdell all of the discontents of the modern law
school. The foundations he created were built upon by others like Roscoe
Pound and Karl Llewellyn to create the dynamic modern American law
school.79 We should not lose sight of its power and great contributions to the
fabric of the law. We may trace the law review to Langdell and indeed its
strange form in assigning students the function of editing the work of law
professors.80 The law review was designed to further the scientific discovery of
the law by students.81
Another Langdellian innovation further distanced the academy from the
profession. In adopting the case method, Langdell could have sent his students
to the library to read cases on their own, but Langdell viewed that solution as
impractical. There were too many cases. Moreover, Langdell did not believe
that it was necessary for students to review all or even most of the cases on a
given subject. On the contrary, he thought that a systematic review would be
detrimental because the vast majority of cases were of no value.82 Students
should only review “sound” or “good” decisions—as selected by their
professors. Langdell solved this problem by creating a casebook containing
selected cases that were worthy of examination.83 Of course, by refusing to
include decisions that were not sufficiently faithful to the “fundamental” rules
and doctrines, Langdell’s casebooks depicted a very limited and inaccurate
view of law. The implication was that, in a given case, lawyers and judges
were searching for the one true rule. Of course, the difficulty is that decisions
that do not adhere to “fundamental rules” are as much a part of the law as those
that are faithful to the “fundamental rules,” and they must be considered if one
is to understand the law. These other decisions have much to teach about the
lawyer’s role and function.
Modern casebooks all too often continue in the Langdellian tradition.
Instead of examining an entire body of case law from a single jurisdiction,
which would reveal inconsistencies in doctrine, students examine law through
79. See HULL, supra note 75, at 339–42.
80. See Michael I. Swygert & Jon W. Bruce, The Historical Origins, Founding, and Early
Development of Student-Edited Law Reviews, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 739, 770–78 (1985).
81. See id. at 776.
82. See LANGDELL, supra note 54, at vi; see also HARNO, supra note 15, at 58; REDLICH,
supra note 15, at 11; Kenny, supra note 30, at 186–87.
83. See LANGDELL, supra note 54, at vii; Kenny, supra note 30, at 187; cf. E. Allan
Farnsworth, Casebooks and Scholarship: Confessions of an American Opinion Clipper, 42 SW.
L.J. 903, 907–08 (1988) (calling the case collection process a “true gathering of flowers”).
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the prism of casebooks that often value doctrinal consistency. Casebook
authors select decisions, primarily from this country with a smattering from
England and the Commonwealth, and these decisions are arranged in doctrinal
fashion. For nearly a century, cases have been selected for many reasons: they
were important to the law’s development; they illustrate the purposes and
policies behind the law; they stimulate student thought about whether a rule is
sound or unsound; or they demonstrate a rule’s application. While doctrinal
organization may be both logical and necessary, it contributes to the
overemphasis on legal principles and on the way that law operates in society.
A critical part of this is but the passing reference to how lawyers function. The
casebooks are themselves limited tools, especially in basic courses, where they
cannot be expected to cover the broad terrain offered here.
II. REMEDIES: A CAPSTONE COURSE THAT CAN INTEGRATE DOCTRINE,
THEORY, AND PRACTICE
We suggest that reforms to the law curriculum should begin with a
touchstone. They should recognize the inherent strengths of American law
school education and its traditions and the economic constraints that make
brave, whole-canvas reforms too utopian. Thus we propose a capstone course
in Remedies that involves a significant step towards showing our students how
their early doctrinal learning can be integrated, and how they, as future
lawyers, can operate in the changing and unpredictable world of practice. It is a
parsimonious suggestion for reform and thus is more likely to find success in
the modern law school.84
So, how does a Remedies course help bridge the divide between theory and
practice? In terms of doctrine, Remedies as a course is unique, and daunting
for the teacher, because it cuts across the boundaries of the law school
curriculum. Instead of dealing with a defined legal subject, Remedies teachers
are challenged to wade into the content of a range of Torts, Contracts,
Property, Constitutional, Criminal, and Administrative Law courses (as well as
a host of other subjects) during a single class. Public law is conjoined with
private law. Why? When equitable remedies are sought, for example, it is not
uncommon to ask certain fundamental questions: What legal remedy is
available to the plaintiff? Is that remedy adequate or inadequate? In order to
answer such questions, the professor and the student must necessarily think
about possible causes of action and the remedies that those causes of action

84. Parsimony refers to a logical principle, if the philosophers will permit the crude rendition
of a lawyer: when you are trying to explain reality, the simpler explanation that accounts for
everything is the more rational, and more likely to be truthful. See Alan Baker, Simplicity, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/simplicity/ (last
updated Feb. 25, 2010). As for reform in law schools, we may not need a philosopher to tell us
that a simpler program of reform is more likely to succeed.
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might produce. Over the course of a semester, a Remedies teacher will have
touched upon a large number of subjects. For a young Remedies teacher, this
aspect of the Remedies course can be trying. For students, this aspect of the
course is enlightening and invigorating, and it helps them bring together their
legal education. The University of Melbourne Law School has given a careful
and convincing rationale for its compulsory course in Remedies.85
Because of the multi-doctrinal nature of Remedies, a course in Remedies
provides a way to integrate both theory and practical skills into a single class
and to teach theory through both academic and practical lenses. In our view,
this is the best way to teach law. Students need to acquire both doctrine and
skills, but there is no essential or critical reason why skills should be taught in
specialized classes. Practicing lawyers rarely have the luxury of choosing to
focus on just “theory” or just “practical skills.” Necessarily, as they practice
law, they utilize both doctrine and skills. A Remedies course is a powerful
antidote to the artificial division of theory and practice; it allows the teacher to
provide both doctrine and skills training simultaneously.
One skill that students can learn in a Remedies class is how to evaluate a
case. Part of the problem with legal education is that students focus on
particular subjects, and view the law through the lenses of those subjects.86
Torts teachers focus on tort principles and tort remedies. Contracts and
Property teachers likewise focus on their own principles and remedies. Thus,
when students take a Torts final exam, they know that they are expected to
apply torts principles. Contracts and Property students know that their final
exams require application of contracts and property principles, respectively.
The practice of law is never so neat or tidy. In most instances, when a client
comes to see a lawyer, the lawyer does not have a complete understanding of
the law and the facts, and therefore does not pigeonhole the case into a
particular legal category (e.g., I have a torts case involving assumption of the
risk). Except when a lawyer is dealing with a highly sophisticated client (e.g., a
corporate client who approaches him through in-house counsel), the actual
practice of law can be a lot messier. A client may come to a lawyer with a
pitiful story and dump a pile of facts on the lawyer’s desk. Sometimes, the
lawyer’s analysis can be complicated by the fact that the client expresses a
great deal of emotion. The lawyer’s task is to sift through the facts and decide
how to proceed. What causes of action are possible? What remedies do those
causes of action produce? Perhaps, indeed, the remedy may be extra-judicial

85. See Handbook, U. MELB., https://handbook.unimelb.edu.au/view/2012/LAWS50036
(last updated Jan. 22, 2009).
86. Of course this goes back to the old treatises culminating in Blackstone that
compartmentalized the law to make it usable and understandable. See A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise
and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L.
REV. 632, 638–41 (1981).
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given the inefficiencies of the judicial remedy. Self-help is the most ancient of
remedies and, as students learn early, may be the most efficient provided that
social peace is not disturbed.
In the process of answering these questions, students can be taught many
practical skills. For example, an essential skill is fact development and
investigation. Most law students find this foreign. Students are hardly at fault.
Throughout much of their law school career, students study law through the
Langdellian prism of appellate opinions. While appellate opinions have value,
especially as a way to analyze and understand the law’s development, they
present an artificial view of the practice of law because the facts in those
opinions have been distilled and synthesized by the lawyers, the trial court, and
the appellate court.87 Moreover, as judges write their opinions, their desire to
be persuasive causes them to include or omit facts depending on whether they
support or detract from the judge’s conclusions.88 As a result, newly-minted
lawyers are not prepared to deal with a client who comes in and dumps a large
quantity of facts on their desks. So, one thing that we try to do in Remedies is
to help students understand the importance of fact investigation.
Of course, students need to learn to “walk” before they learn how to “run.”
We often spend the first part of the semester giving our students a
comprehensive understanding of the history of equity, and more particularly
equitable remedies, and the relationship between equitable remedies and legal
remedies.89 We also talk about issues such as enforcement of remedies.90
While students will sometimes know something about equity from their first-

87. See Weaver, supra note 14, at 570–71; see also HARNO, supra note 15, at 152 (“The
appellate decisions the student reads have fact situations, to be sure, but they do not involve facts
‘in the raw’ such as the lawyer must struggle with. ‘The facts as reported in the published
decision have often gone through a triple process of distillation: unorganized “real” facts are
reduced to the facts proved in court; the facts proved in court may be reduced still further to the
facts appearing in the written record on appeal; finally the facts of the written record are reduced
to the facts reported by judge or reporter in the published decision.’”); Albert S. Osborn, A Case
Book on Thought and Reasoning, 11 VA. L. REV. 89, 90 (1924) (“The finding, presenting,
proving, discussing and interpreting of certain facts make up a large part, perhaps four-fifths or
even nine-tenths, of trials at law, so-called.”).
88. See Weaver, supra note 14, at 571–72. Perhaps the most notable example of a judicial
statement of facts in the tendentious tradition is Justice Cardozo’s rendition of the accident in the
famous torts decision of Palsgraf. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F.
PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 327 (12th ed.
2010). This rendition of the facts was critical to his famous holding about the nature of the duty
of care; it is the facts that answer the question of whether a duty was owed to Mrs. Palsgraf
herself. The duty is relative. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and
Preemption, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1757, 1767 (2012).
89. See RUSSELL L. WEAVER, DAVID F. PARTLETT, MICHAEL B. KELLY & W. JONATHAN
CARDI, REMEDIES: CASES, PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND EXERCISES 6–81 (2d ed. 2010).
90. Id. at 82–140.
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year courses, particularly Contracts, the knowledge is fragmentary and
ineffective in informing them of how equitable remedies relate to legal
remedies, as well as the differences in enforcement. Most especially, they do
not understand how those differences affect lawyers in the litigation of cases.
We then spend some time talking about injunctions,91 and making sure that
students have a thorough grounding in restitution.92 As with equitable remedies
and equitable enforcement issues, while students may have been introduced to
these matters in other classes, they usually have had but a passing introduction
to the topics.
Once students have this basic knowledge, the Remedies course offers
students the opportunity to work with the law in context. Particularly effective
are problems that take the student to a set of facts that have no predetermined
categorical boundaries. At the end of the semester, either in class or in a final
exam, it is possible to give students problems that force them to actively
engage themselves in a case. For example, students can be presented with
hypothetical facts:
Your client owns an heirloom pocket watch that was given to him by his father
as a graduation present. The watch is stolen by Jonathan Baird (Baird broke
into your client’s home and took the watch along with other things). What
remedies are available to the client?

The answer to the problem may seem obvious. Since the watch is an
heirloom, one might assume the client would like to have the watch back, and
therefore the student might have a tendency to focus on restorative remedies.
Of course, even a case like this provides the teacher with the opportunity to
discuss the lawyer’s role, and the fact that the lawyer is charged with achieving
the client’s objectives. If (as one might guess) the client wants the watch back,
the lawyer will have several options available to him/her. On the other hand, if
the client prefers damages, the case might proceed in an entirely different way.
In a final exam context, we will sometimes offer our students the opportunity
to do practical things, such as interviewing the client. This can come in the
form of a traditional sit-down interview, or could be done simply by email in
which the lawyer asks the client (with, perhaps, the professor serving as a
surrogate for the hypothetical client) questions about the facts, as well as about
his/her desires related to the outcome of the case.
Of course, the next step for a lawyer is to ascertain the facts, and to decide
how to litigate the case. The case might be litigated under any of a variety of
theories. For one thing, if the client has not already done so, a decision must be
made regarding whether to press criminal charges against the thief. However,
if the client wants to regain the watch, the lawyer might consider bringing a

91. Id. at 141–369.
92. Id. at 370–445.
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replevin action (or whatever the modern equivalent of replevin is called in his
or her jurisdiction), or even seeking an injunction. On the other hand, if the
client seeks damages, the attorney might think about the possibility of bringing
the case on a tort (conversion) theory, or even on a restitution theory.
Of course, a full decision about how to proceed requires a level of fact
investigation. As noted earlier, one of the problems with legal education is that
students are used to being presented with pre-synthesized facts, and are rarely
taught to engage in fact investigation. The stolen watch problem can give
students the opportunity to work with fact development. If, for example, the
client wants the watch back, the client must attempt to find out who has the
watch and where it is located. The thief might still have the watch, but the thief
might have given or sold the watch to someone else. It might have been
accidentally destroyed. Even if the client wants damages, discovery will be
necessary. Suppose that the thief is insolvent, but the thief sold the watch to a
pawnshop or another individual. It might be helpful to know whether the
purchaser paid value for the watch, and whether the purchaser bought the
watch with notice of the theft.
The answers to these questions may control or limit the causes of action
and remedies available to the client, and they may drive the client in quite
different directions depending on the answers. For example, if the watch has
been destroyed and thrown away, there may be no hope of retrieving it, and the
only available option may be damages. So, the lawyer may be forced to think
about possible defendants (if the watch was sold before it was destroyed, it
might be possible to sue the purchaser), including the solvency of those
defendants, and the possible remedies that might be sought from them. If the
thief is insolvent, there may be no point in suing him. On the other hand, if he
has money, damages are potentially recoverable. Of course, the purchaser can
probably be sued on a conversion theory, and a possible bona fide purchaser
(“BFP”) defense would be unavailable. Alternatively, if the purchaser is a
BFP, a restitution theory might not be wise (at least, against the BFP). Indeed,
depending on what the thief did with any payment received, it might be
possible to trace the proceeds into other forms, and to impose either a
constructive trust or equitable lien on those proceeds. Of course, the facts
might push the attorney in a quite different direction. Suppose that the client
wants the watch back. Presumably, the lawyer might resort to the modern
equivalent of replevin, or seek injunctive relief, and perhaps could utilize the
police to help retrieve stolen property.
The range of scenarios and the range of possible actions are endless. Much
depends on what the client wants and how the facts play out. As a result, an
essential next step in a Remedies course is to give students the opportunity for
fact investigation. As part of a class exercise or a final exam, students can be
given the opportunity to send questions or “interrogatories” to their client or to
opposing parties. Since this is a simulation, the questions can simply be sent to
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the professor who will provide the answers, and the students might have an
endless array of questions. What happened to the watch? Does Baird still have
it? If not, who does? If the watch was acquired, how was it acquired? Did the
purchaser buy it? Did the purchaser have notice of the theft? Was it a gift?
What did Baird do with the proceeds? Is Baird solvent (or, for that matter,
well-off)? What about the purchaser? Of course, the answers to these questions
may lead to other questions. What did Baird do with the proceeds? Can they be
traced into other forms as to which a constructive trust or equitable lien may be
asserted?
Of course, as part of this process, students can be asked to prepare the
necessary legal documents. If they intend to seek damages, they can draft the
legal complaint. If they wish to seek injunctive relief or the modern equivalent
of replevin, students can be asked to draft the petition and the request for
injunctive relief. If they wish to seek temporary relief as well, they can produce
the necessary additional documents. If the factual investigation suggests that
students need to alter or amend their complaints, or their requests for relief,
they can be asked to amend their original documents.
CONCLUSION
In this short Article, we have tried to suggest how Remedies can function
as a capstone course that integrates substantive doctrine and skills and allows
students to view law in an integrated manner that crosses doctrinal boundaries.
It can also allow students to develop their skills, both client interviewing and
fact investigation. Finally, the course gives students the chance to draft
documents. Of course, it’s possible to carry the skills component even further.
For example, if students wish to seek temporary injunctive relief on behalf of
their clients, they can be allowed to argue the case. In other words, in multiple
ways, a course in Remedies can be viewed as a capstone course that allows
students to view law in an integrated way, to develop practical skills, and to
deal with skills and doctrine in an integrated way.93

93. Thinking about the place of Remedies in a law curriculum has reached a maturity in
other common law systems. The famous paper is Peter Birks’s Blackstone Lecture. See Peter
Birks, Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 20 O.J.L.S. 1 (2000). Another influential article is S. M.
Waddams, Remedies as a Legal Subject, 3 O.J.L.S. 113 (1983). For a recent and comprehensive
piece, see Jeffrey Berryman, The Law of Remedies: A Prospectus for Teaching and Scholarship,
10 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 123 (2010). The field has been given a boost through the
scholarship of Michael Tilbury whose casebook, MICHAEL TILBURY, MICHAEL GILLOOLY, ELISE
BANT & NORMANN WITZLEB, REMEDIES: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2011), is
widely used in the Commonwealth. It is noteworthy that the Remedies course has failed to gain
traction in the UK likely because of the strong English tradition of viewing the world through
obligations. To be sure, however, English law students obtain a more formal and thorough
grounding in Equity.
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An intellectual skill of no modest moment is the ability of the Remedies
course to give students a keen appreciation of the energy of the common law.
The classifications are not closed. Thus in Remedies, students will be taken to
equity to appreciate the open-textured nature of the common law. A cause of
action in nuisance may be available, but what should be the remedy? The
fundamental ideas about property and liability rules are examined rigorously in
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.94 and in the cases that follow it when crafting a
remedy that is fair and efficient. A new vista is opened.
In covering restitution the same dynamism may be seen. This field is now
finding its feet again through the estimable Restatement of Restitution recently
published by the American Law Institute.95 Alongside better-known causes of
action, restitution will likely gain traction as a remedial engine with the force
of the Restatement and the acceptance and strong momentum of the action
elsewhere in the common law world. In the bankruptcy following the Madoff
Ponzi scheme, the puzzle was seen as statutory.96 Yet, a proper appreciation of
the restitution claims of claimants adds an important arrow in the quiver of
remedies.97 The same is true when looking afield at the compensation claims of
victims of the BP oil spill. To view the claims not solely through the lens of
class actions in tort, but also through restitution, provides a valuable
perspective.98 It is not surprising that Remedies is required on the California
Bar Exam.99 It is also to be found as a compulsory course in the curriculums of
several leading Anglo-American law schools.100

94. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). This case is an antidote to a rigid notion of “right” in tort
law. A court will account for third-party interests in granting a remedy. See Gregory C. Keating,
Nuisance as a Strict Liability Wrong 42 (Univ. of S. Cal. Law & Econ. Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 134, 2011) (asserting that Boomer shows that tort liability is not bilateral), available at
http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/art134. Thus, the remedy reveals the nature of the tort.
95. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2011).
96. See Andrew Kull, Common-Law Restitution and the Madoff Liquidation, 92 B.U. L.
REV. 939, 940 (2012) (noting that the Madoff cases adhered to bankruptcy legislation for
resolution). It is likely that jurisdictions in the Anglo-American orbit will take close note of the
developments in restitution in the United States. For a comprehensive statement of English
restitution law, see ANDREW BURROWS, A RESTATEMENT OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF UNJUST
ENRICHMENT (2012).
97. Professor Andrew Kull, reporter of the Restatement of Restitution, takes to task the
published opinions on the Madoff cases, arguing that the decisions in these cases turn on schemes
that are “textbook restitution issues,” in perhaps “the greatest restitution case in history.” See id.
98. See David F. Partlett & Russell L. Weaver, BP Oil Spill: Compensation, Agency Costs,
and Restitution, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1341, 1363–75 (2011) (describing the structure and
advantages of a restitutionary scheme for resolving these claims).
99. See Subjects Tested on the California Bar Examination, USC GOULD SCH. L.,
http://weblaw.usc.edu/why/academics/bar/subjectsTested.cfm%20 (last visited Aug. 23, 2012).
100. Five Australian university law schools require it: the University of Melbourne, the
University of Notre Dame, the University of Queensland, Macquarie University, and the
University of Western Sydney. See The Melbourne JD: Compulsory Subjects, U. MELB.,

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

TEACHING REMEDIES AS A CAPSTONE COURSE

629

More fundamentally, the Remedies course brings to bear three years of
education on problems that oblige law students to see the law’s fabric as a
whole. Perhaps for the first time in their legal careers, students will be able to
see how discrete areas of the law interact with each other. Tort and
constitutional law find common cause in remedies for invasions of privacy.
Tort and contract interact in pre-contractual negotiations. How are the
purposive inconsistencies in the divisions of law to be resolved? Outside a
Remedies capstone course, the student will not have a chance to think across
the boundaries of these substantive categories.
We wish at the end to point out that the Remedies course touches an
essential aspect of practice in a globalizing world. The course should recognize
that the practice of law reaches beyond national boundaries. A defamation
judgment granted in an English court may have limits on its enforceability
elsewhere.101 An injunction to prevent an invasion of privacy or confidentiality
may have little chance of enforcement in other courts.102 The public policies
vary and students will be challenged in the way that the best legal education
does, delving into the function of legal rules and helping students acquire a set
of intellectual skills that will set their compass for decades of a life in the law.
Undoubtedly, such training will help law school graduates deal with the
changes brought on by globalization, some of which will be seismic in nature,
and will help them deal with the changes that come hand-in-hand with lawyers
functioning as social engineers.103 The scope of the lawyer’s role may range

http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/jd/course-and-subjects/the-course/compulsory-subjects (last
visited Feb. 9, 2013); Compulsory Units in the LLB as a Single or Double Degree, U. NOTRE
DAME, http://www.nd.edu.au/units/lw.shtml (last visited Feb. 9, 2013); Bachelor of Laws
Compulsory Course List, U. QUEENSL. AUSTL., http://www.law.uq.edu.au/llb-compulsorycourse-list (last visited Feb. 9, 2013); Bachelor of Laws: What You Will Study, MACQUARIE U.,
http://courses.mq.edu.au/undergraduate/degree/bachelor-of-laws (last visited Feb. 9, 2013);
Admission and Unit Information—Bachelor of Laws (Non-Graduate Entry), U. W. SYDNEY,
http://future.uws.edu.au/future_students_home/ug/law/non_grad_entry/admission_and_unit_infor
mation_bachelor_of_laws_non-graduate_entry (last visited Feb. 9, 2013).
101. See, e.g., David Partlett & Barbara McDonald, International Publications and Protection
of Reputation: A Margin of Appreciation but Not Subservience?, 62 ALA. L. REV. 477 (2011)
(providing a look at traditions in defamation that quite literally compete, as strong American
constitutional values travel abroad and are contested at home); see also Lili Levi, The Problem of
Trans-National Libel, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 507 (2012) (surveying the comparative law and
American response and joining the debate on appropriate solutions to the issues).
102. See SCHWARTZ, KELLY & PARTLETT, supra note 88, at 1008 (discussing the Spycatcher
litigation, where the British government attempted to suppress, in Australian courts, the
publication of a memoir written by an M.I.5 agent, and ended up “wag[ing] a global campaign”).
The students will perceive that the law is polyphonic in its function, speaking with different and
sometimes conflicting voices, at the levels of the state, the nation, the regional organization, and
the transnational tribunal.
103. We recognize that this is a term now out of favor in postmodern society, but in our view
the well-trained lawyer provides the oil to the gears of a modern complex society. Note most
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from business deals to human rights enforcement. An investment in training
the best lawyers pays its social dividends here. Here the task of legal education
is to provide not an education bounded by today’s challenges but one
commensurate with the unknowns of tomorrow.

recently the Apple/Samsung patent litigation where the issues of remedies will prove central and
crucial. See Hiroko Tabuchi & Nick Wingfield, Tokyo Court Hands Win to Samsung Over Apple,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2012, at B1. Where the law is seen as utilitarian as it generally is, the social
purpose of legal norms calls lawyers to the task of renewing and reforming law according to those
utilitarian purposes. See Mark A. Geistfeld, The Coherence of Compensation-Deterrence Theory
in Tort Law, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 383, 412 (2012) (arguing that tort law is “an exercise in social
engineering”).

